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SYMPOSIUM, ERIE AT EIGHTY: CHOICE OF LAW ACROSS THE DISCIPLINES 
ERIE AND CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE: AN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 
Craig Green* 
Only a few cases in American law have their own birthday 
celebrations. Over the years, there have been temporally benchmarked 
events to commemorate Marbury, Brown, Miranda, Roe, Chevron, and a 
few other iconic decisions.1 This symposium for Erie’s 80th anniversary 
is similarly distinctive, and I would like to start by considering what 
qualifies judicial rulings for such memorialization in doctrinal history. 
Year after year, the continuous stream of new cases never runs dry, yet 
* James E. Beasley Professor of Law, Temple University; Ph.D., Princeton University; J.D., Yale
Law School. Many thanks for comments on earlier drafts by Jane Baron, Pamela Bookman, Andrea 
Monroe, and Rachel Rebouché. Thanks also to Owen Healy, Colin Kane, Linda Levinson, and Bryan 
Shapiro for excellent research assistance. 
1. E.g., Symposium, Erie Railroad at Seventy-Five, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 1 (2013);
Symposium, Law Without Lawmakers, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 655 (2013) (including several 
analyses of Erie on the decision’s seventy-fifth anniversary); The Golden Anniversary Year: Erie R.R. 
Co. v. Tompkins and the Federal Rules, 1988 AALS Proceedings 1, 130 (1988); see, e.g., Marbury 
v. Madison: A Bicentennial Symposium, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105 (2003), Symposium, Judging Judicial
Review: Marbury in the Modern Era, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2557 (2003), Symposium: Brown at Fifty, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 1302 (2004); Symposium, Revisiting Brown v. Board of Education: 50 Years of 
Legal and Social Debate, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 279 (2005); Samuel W. Calhoun, Roe at 40: The 
Controversy Continues, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 817 (2014); Symposium, Fifty Years of 
International Shoe: The Past and Future of Personal Jurisdiction, 28 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 513 (1995); 
Symposium, The 50th Anniversary of Griswold v. Connecticut, Privacy Laws Today, 47 CONN. L. 
REV. 971 (2015); Symposium, The Fiftieth Anniversary of Miranda v. Arizona, 97 B.U. L. REV. 681 
(2017); Symposium, Twenty Years After: The Impact of the Chevron Decision Upon the Development 
of Federal Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L. J. 1 (2005); see also, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, The 
Ghost of Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie, 54 
BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1988); Mary Kay Kane, The Golden Wedding Year: Erie Railroad Company v. 
Tompkins and the Federal Rules, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 671 (1988); James A. Gorrell & Ithamar 
D. Weed, Erie Railroad: Ten Years After, 9 OHIO ST. L. J. 276 (1948); Joseph L. Lenihan, Erie 
Railroad v. Tompkins – After Fifty Years, 53 KY. BENCH & B. 22 (1989); Richard D. Freer, Erie’s 
Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1087 (1989). 
1
Green: <i>Erie</i> and Constitutional Structure
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019
260 AKRON LAW REVIEW [52:259 
some rulings hold persistent spots in the legal pantheon, with 
corresponding recognition on a grand historical calendar. 
Although it may not be possible to fully explain why particular iconic 
cases tower over the rest, there are a few general characteristics that are 
worth mentioning. For instance, any legal community that commemorates 
a judicial decision almost certainly believes that it accomplished 
something singular and distinctive. An iconic case cannot simply 
represent a long line of precedent, and a smooth arc of case law would not 
produce a specific moment to celebrate. On the contrary, there must be a 
dramatic break with a pre-decisional past or some extraordinary 
application of existing doctrine to unconsidered facts. 
Likewise, cases with anniversary celebrations must represent 
something larger than themselves. That is why iconic decisions often 
include grand or indeterminate language, which allows future generations 
to interpret and reinterpret doctrinal meanings under variable 
circumstances. Debates over iconic cases, insofar as they remain iconic, 
are never truly resolved, and that is partly the point. Interpretations tend 
to cycle and develop, raising new questions and answers, even as they 
shift and readjust to meet new interpretive priorities.2 
Erie satisfies all of those criteria, and this essay will sketch some of 
the decision’s history as a jurisprudential icon before concluding with a 
few theoretical issues about the stability of judicial precedents as a form 
of legal authority. The most important thing to understand about Erie is 
that the iconic decision today is not what it used to be, and the case might 
not remain in the future what it is right now.3 Changes in political context, 
judicial personnel, economic consequences, and even academic 
commentary have all combined to determine Erie’s doctrinal meaning 
over time. And in turn, that process will continue onward for as long as 
any legal community cares enough to notice. Happy birthday, Erie! 
This essay proceeds in five steps, which will identify themselves 
individually as they unfold. The first step is to describe Erie’s original 
reception in 1938. Everyone knows that the Court addressed a political 
and pragmatic problem about judicial management, while declaring a 
constitutional principle that litigants and contemporary commentators 
2. See Craig Green, Turning the Kaleidoscope: Toward a Theory of Interpreting Precedents, 
94 N.C. L. REV. 379 (2016). 
3. For similarly historicized accounts of Erie, see EDWARD PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE 
PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL 
COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2d ed. 2000); TONY FREYER, HARMONY & 
DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT & ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1981); and Daniel R. Ernst, 
Thinking Like a Historian: Erie in the Dimension of Time, 26 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 719 (2001) (book 
review). 
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never contemplated or proposed.4 During the years that followed, 
however, the Supreme Court relied on Erie many times to resolve 
important technical issues, without mentioning Erie’s original holding as 
a matter of constitutional law.5 
Likewise, legal commentators in Erie’s first decade expressed some 
mixture of confusion and resistance with respect to the Court’s 
constitutional reasoning. In 1938, editors at the Harvard Law Review were 
stunned by the Court’s startling avowal that Swift v. Tyson was 
unconstitutional, describing with remarkable charity: “the gratuitous 
courage of the Court and the fluidity of the Constitution.”6 Only students 
who studied law during the New Deal Court’s switch in time could so 
unequivocally celebrate the kind of radical courage and unprincipled 
4. Green, supra note 3, at 430
[T]he lawyers in Swift argued their case as though it were a mountain, but the Court 
decided a molehill. The opposite was true in Erie. No lawyer had suggested that ‘the oft-
challenged doctrine of Swift v. Tyson should be disapproved.’ Nor did anyone but the 
Supreme Court foresee that as even a possibility. The district judge—a Roosevelt 
appointee hearing his first civil case—had applied federal general common law without 
hesitation. And a Second Circuit panel that included Learned Hand and Thomas Swan had 
unanimously used federal general common law with casual confidence.”  
(footnotes omitted) By contrast, many pre-Erie commentators had objected to federal general 
common law on practical and political grounds. See e.g., CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (Felix Frankfurter & Wilber G. Katz eds., Callaghan & Co. 
1931) (compiling pragmatic critiques); see also Green, supra note 2, at 424–26. 
5. For an early set of post-Erie Supreme Court cases that applied the decision’s result without 
invoking its constitutional rationale, see, for example, Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 
U.S. 541 (1949); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer 
& Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); 
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943); Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941); Klaxon Co. v. 
Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Vandenbark v. Owens-Ill. Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538 
(1941); Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 (1940); West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 
311 U.S. 223 (1940); Six Companies of California v. Joint Highway Dist. No. 13, 311 U.S. 180 
(1940); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940); Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280 (1940); 
Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939); Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat. Bank of 
Wichita Falls, 306 U.S. 103 (1939); and Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202 (1938). Cf. 
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (applying Federal Rules of Civil Procedure without 
invoking constitutional limits). The only opinions that I have found from this era to explicitly discuss 
constitutional arguments were dissenting opinions from Justice Rutledge, and in any event, Rutledge 
was highly dubious of those arguments’ merit. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 558 (Rutledge, J., dissenting)  
[Erie] held that district courts in diversity cases must apply state law, decisional as well as 
statutory, in determining matters of substantive law . . . . I accept that view generally and 
insofar as it involves a wise rule of administration for the federal courts, though I have 
grave doubt that it has any solid constitutional foundation.  
Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 117 (“I cannot say . . . . as was said in the Erie case [about state 
negligence standards], that the matter [of state statutes of limitations in equity cases] is beyond the 
power of Congress to control.”) 
6. Commentary, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1245, 1217-1220 (1938) (emphasis added). 
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fluidity that later generations might have described as judicial activism.7 
Just a few years later, a different group of Harvard student editors would 
express skepticism and resignation about Erie’s original logic, forecasting 
with weary sophistication that, “[d]espite attacks on its constitutional 
basis, queries as to its historical validity, and criticisms of its 
jurisprudential assumptions, Erie R. R. v. Tompkins is probably here to 
stay.”8 
The reaction of Solicitor General Robert Jackson to Erie’s 
constitutional reasoning was tepid from the start.9 In a public lecture, 
Jackson endorsed the decision’s result as “one of the most dramatic 
episodes in the history of the Supreme Court,” but he insisted that “the 
Court might well have avoided resort to statutory or constitutional 
grounds, and placed its decision solely on the grounds of sound practice 
for the Federal courts.”10 Likewise, Charles McCormick and Elvin Hale 
Hewins wrote in 1938 that Erie’s constitutional arguments were on 
jurisprudentially quaky ground and represented a vulnerable “Achilles 
tendon of the opinion.”11 The authors criticized Justice Brandeis as a 
hypocrite because, despite general admonitions that judges should avoid 
unnecessary constitutional issues, “he seems in his anxiety to attain ends 
which he believes desirable, to depart from standards which he thinks 
should control others.”12 
In 1941, practitioner Lawrence Earl Broh-Kahn wrote an extensive 
article that canvassed eighteenth-century historical materials before 
concluding that Erie’s “revolution in our jurisprudence” amounted to a 
constitutional “amendment by [judicial] decision.”13 In Broh-Kahn’s 
view, that kind of radical jurisprudential action “may be wise or unwise. 
7. See Craig Green, An Intellectual History of Judicial Activism, 58 EMORY L.J. 1195 (2009). 
8. How a Federal Court Determines State Law, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1299, 1299 (1946). 
9. See Robert H. Jackson, The Rise and Fall of Swift v. Tyson, 24 A.B.A. J. 609 (1938). 
10. Id. at 644; cf. T.A. Cowan, Constitutional Aspects of the Abolition of Federal Common
Law, 1 LA. L. REV. 161 (1938) (suggesting that the only plausible constitutional argument—though 
paradoxical in its mixture of statutory and constitutional authority—was that federal courts under 
Swift v. Tyson had unconstitutionally failed to apply the Rules of Decision Act). 
11. Charles T. McCormick & Elvin Hale Hewins, Collapse of “General” Law in the Federal
Courts, 33 ILL. L. REV. 126, 133–34 (1938). 
12. Id. at 134–35; see also Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 345–48 
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (1936) (“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question, although 
properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may 
be disposed of.”). See generally Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 103 (1944) 
(Frankfurter, J.) (“If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of 
constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless 
such adjudication is unavoidable.”). 
13. Lawrence Earl Broh-Kahn, Amendment by Decision—More on the Erie Case, 30 KY. L. J. 
3, 3 (1941). 
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It may even be an usurpation of power by the judiciary. The important 
thing is that it should be recognized when it occurs. If unwise, it can then 
be corrected.”14 Broh-Kahn thought that judicial self-correction was 
certainly appropriate for Erie because any practical problems under Swift 
should have been addressed “as a matter of comity or independent 
appraisal and decision rather than by reason of any non-existent 
constitutional . . . compulsion.”15 
In 1946, Judge Charles Clark heaped more criticism on Erie’s 
constitutional reasoning: “[a]mong many troublesome features of the 
opinion [the Court’s constitutional argument] is perhaps the most 
troublesome; at least commentators have found it so.”16 Clark generalized 
with remarkable breadth, claiming that the Court’s constitutional 
objection to Swift v. Tyson “has always puzzled commentators, who have 
been wont to consider the statement as a dictum,” even as he noticed that 
Erie’s original approach “seems to have been rather carefully avoided by 
the Court ever since.”17 Clark obviously misread the Erie Court’s 
constitutional rhetoric in declaring that “dictum it surely seems to be.”18 
But for present purposes, Clark’s interpretation also highlights how 
unsatisfactory he found the Court’s arguments as a matter of substantive 
law. 
Helen Silving—who would become the United States’ first female 
law professor—was more resigned to Erie’s constitutional reasoning than 
Judge Clark.19 In 1946, she wrote with notable emphasis: “Clearly, 
constitutional provisions mean what the Supreme Court, in its latest 
decision, says they mean, and the [holding of the] Supreme Court in Erie 
v. Tompkins, . . . however fallacious, was thereby transformed into law.”20
She continued, “[o]nce a jurisprudential doctrine has been proclaimed to 
be law in the proper form of the law, its fallacious doctrinal source does 
not impair its validity as law. By being incorporated into the law, it ceases 
14. Id. at 57. 
15. Id. at 60; cf. Lawrence Earl Broh-Kahn, Uniformity Run Riot—Extensions of the Erie Case, 
31 KY. L.J. 99 (1943) (offering substantive criticism of the Supreme Court’s post-Erie decisions, 
despite noting that the latter rulings did not repeat Erie’s constitutional rationale). 
16. Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. 
Tompkins, 55 YALE L. J. 267, 273–74 & n.27 (1946) (citing seven criticisms of Erie’s constitutional 
argument in addition to those discussed supra). 
17. Id. at 278. 
18. Id. 
19. See Reut Yael Paz, A Forgotten Kelsenian? The Story of Helen Silving-Ryu (1906-1993), 
25 EUR. J. INTL. L. 1123 (2014). 
20. Helen Silving, Analogies Extending and Restricting Federal Jurisdiction: Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins and the Law of Conflict, 31 IOWA L. REV. 330, 339 (1946) (footnotes omitted). 
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to be a jurisprudential proposition and becomes a rule of law.”21 Silving 
did not address whether Erie’s legal decision should continue to be 
described as constitutional if the Supreme Court deliberately chooses not 
to invoke constitutional law in its latest decision[s] applying the Erie 
doctrine—as happened for eight years prior to Silving’s article and would 
continue for decades afterward.22 
It would be easy enough for this essay to collect additional examples 
of constitutional criticism of Erie from this period, especially because my 
own doubts about Erie’s constitutional arguments are also well 
documented.23 However, this is not the place to pursue substantive 
constitutional debates about Erie, and even Alfred Hill’s rare defense of 
Erie’s constitutional arguments twenty years after the Court’s decision 
acknowledged that “the constitutional basis of Erie has been widely 
regarded as dictum, and rather dubious dictum at best.”24 Instead, the more 
immediate goal is to show that—in the years that followed Erie—
constitutional arguments shifted from being an explicitly essential part of 
the Court’s holding to being a legal embarrassment that many judges, 
lawyers, and commentators at the time set aside with varying levels of 
grace and diplomacy. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Compare, e.g., Arthur John Keeffe et al., Weary Erie, 34 CORNELL L. Q. 494, 524 (1949) 
(“Any attempt to attack Swift v. Tyson on constitutional grounds is untenable. The argument is so 
devoid of merit that even the most ardent defenders of Erie have abandoned it.”), and PURCELL, supra 
note 3, at 196 (“Even many of Brandeis’s friends and admirers were disturbed. ‘I really do not like 
the way [the Constitution] was handled by [Brandeis] and much preferred [the statutory argument of] 
Stanley Reed,’ Judge Augustus N. Hand confessed, and Professor Thomas Reed Powell of Harvard 
Law School upbraided Brandeis for ‘violating many of the canons of constitutional adjudication upon 
which he has often strongly insisted.’”), and id. at 215 (quoting a letter from Felix Frankfurter to 
Henry Hart: “Of course Brandeis talked of constitutionality. But is it necessary to be bound by what 
he said? . . . [T]he fact that Brandeis invoked constitutional considerations does not demonstrate their 
validity.”), and id. at 217 (“[Harvard Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr.] scorned Erie’s constitutional 
language as a ‘comic element’ that was ‘probably no longer accepted,’ while Brainerd Currie, another 
prominent scholar, dismissed it disdainfully as ‘a bit of judicial hyperbole’ that ‘should not be 
permitted to mislead even the most literal-minded reader.’”), with Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s 
Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 595 (2008) [hereinafter Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth], and Craig Green, 
Erie and Problems of Constitutional Structure, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 661 (2008), and Craig Green, Can 
Erie Survive as Federal Common Law?, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 813 (2013), and Green, supra note 
2. See generally Symposium, Craig Green, Black-and-White Judging in a World of Grays, 46 TULSA 
L. REV. 391 (2011) (discussing the operation of non-constitutional Erie analysis in the context of 
Shady Grove and the Roberts Court). For extensive counter-arguments concerning Erie’s 
constitutional basis, see Ernest A. Young, A General Defense of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 10 
J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 17 (2013). 
24. Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 NW. L. REV. 427, 427 & n.3 (1958-
1959) (collecting many sources, predominantly opposing Erie’s constitutional rationale). 
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Step two explains Erie’s emergence as a featured element of the legal 
process movement. Some scholars today use provocative phrases like Our 
Federalism and constitutional structure as though theories of legal 
process were expressions of timeless truth. Yet this essay considers Erie’s 
meaning for the legal process school as a strictly historical phenomenon. 
In the spring of 1938, when Justice Brandeis wrote that Swift v. Tyson was 
unconstitutional, legal process scholarship was still in its earliest stages. 
During the next three decades, academics voiced broad theories and 
principles about constitutional law that echoed legal process methods of 
interpreting statutes based on legislative purposes and functions.25 Erie 
cohered well with all of those techniques, and it was featured in the most 
important teaching materials from the legal process era: Hart and 
Wechsler’s casebook The Federal Courts and the Federal System.26 
Erie and legal process ideology were mutually supportive. During 
Erie’s first decade of jurisprudential life, the Court’s holding had become 
immensely powerful in American law, affecting thousands of cases per 
year. And even though the decision’s stated rationale was contested and 
vulnerable, post hoc rationales were not so hard to conjure using some 
mixture of pragmatism, legal philosophy, federalism, and separation of 
powers. Meanwhile, on the academic side of the ledger, many legal 
process scholars resisted legal positivism and its technical obsession with 
formal legal sources, instead emphasizing broader concepts such as legal 
system, purpose, and institutional effectiveness. Themes from the Hart 
and Wechsler paradigm simultaneously matched and reinforced Erie’s 
doctrinal reconstruction as scholars analyzed Erie’s meaning without 
granting decisive authority to its original text or history—just like many 
courts and lawyers had done for years. As one modern historian explained, 
“[f]or the generations of law students who learned federal jurisdiction 
from the Hart and Wechsler casebook, the meaning of Erie was 
25. For historical accounts of the decline and resurgence of various legal process ideologies, 
see PURCELL, supra note 3, at 222–84; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of 
The Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031 (1994); Weinstein, supra note 1, at 19–21; Edward L. 
Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (1996); John David Ohlendorf, Purposivism Outside Statutory 
Interpretation, 21 TEX. REV. L. & POL’Y 235, 243–44 (2016); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The New 
Legal Process: Games People Play and the Quest for Legitimate Judicial Decision Making, 77 WASH. 
U. L. Q. 993, 999–1003 (1999); Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 23 n.99 (2006). 
26. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47
VAND. L. REV. 953 (1994); Ann Althouse, Late Night Confessions in the Hart and Wechsler Hotel, 
47 VAND. L. REV. 993 (1994); Judith Resnik, Rereading “The Federal Courts”: Revising the Domain 
of Federal Courts Jurisprudence at the End of the Twentieth Century, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1021 (1994). 
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powerfully, if somewhat imprecisely, etched. To those who believed in 
neutral principles, Erie seemed rational and proper.”27 
John Hart Ely’s well-known article, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 
offers a particularly fine illustration of legal process thinking scholarship 
about Erie, along with responses from Abram Chayes and Paul Mishkin. 
Echoing the Court’s pragmatic opinion in Hanna v. Plumer, Ely explained 
that only a narrow band of Erie cases should be determined by the 
application of enforceable constitutional limits—the rest should be 
determined by functionalist interpretations of statutory law.28 
Chayes replied by disputing all of Ely’s doctrinal conclusions. Yet 
even as he argued that “general principles—even in definitive articles—
do not decide concrete cases,” Chayes used exactly the same analytical 
approach as Ely: balancing systemic interests that legal process 
vocabulary characterized as neutral, objective, and firmly anchored in a 
temporally transcendent now.29 Without any detailed attention to the 
Court’s original language or context, legal process arguments applying 
Erie were predominantly pragmatic and forward-looking.30 Thus, Ely and 
Chayes both sought to describe a reasonable and workable balance 
between state and federal law that could claim to represent a legal 
consensus, despite and amid the authors’ stark disagreements about 
particular substantive results. 
On the surface, Paul Mishkin’s commentary seemed more attentive 
to constitutional arguments and principles than earlier discussants. 
Whereas Ely saw “the Constitution as having no special view on the 
power of federal courts” to apply state or federal substantive law, Mishkin 
wrote that “the Constitution bears not only on congressional power but 
also imposes a distinctive, independently significant limit on the authority 
27. PURCELL, supra note 3, at 247. 
28. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 698 (1974). 
29. Abram Chayes, The Bead Game, 87 HARV. L. REV. 741, 753 (1974) (“The method of our
trade is to impose rational purposes on history, or at least legal history. But we are condemned to 
teleology, not licensed.”); see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 
54 COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1954)  
The law which governs daily living in the United States is a single system of law: it speaks 
in relation to any particular question with only one ultimately authoritative voice, however 
difficult it may be on occasion to discern in advance which of two or more conflicting 
voices really carries authority. In the long run and in the large, this must be so. 
30. So also were Henry Hart’s legal process arguments that defended Erie as “superbly right.” 
PURCELL, supra note 3, at 247; see also Hart, supra note 29, at 506 (“[Erie] put an end to [Swift’s] 
offense to the most basic concepts of justice according to law.”); id. at 512 (describing “the essential 
rationale of the Erie opinion” as a present-tense and timeless “need of recognizing state courts as 
organs of coordinate authority with other branches of the state government in the discharge of the 
constitutional functions of the states”). 
8
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of federal courts.”31 Mishkin’s rhetoric resonates comfortably with 
modern commentaries that defend Erie’s constitutional analysis.32 Yet it 
is equally important to understand that Mishkin used the term 
constitutional in a particularly flexible way that, like other aspects of legal 
process theory, could never satisfy the technical rigors that were later 
required by formalist methodologies like constitutional originalism or 
textualism. According to Mishkin: 
It makes no difference . . . whether the core of Erie [is] perceived as 
“Constitutional” in the sense that Congress could not validly enact a 
statute entirely contrary to the Rules of Decision Act, or merely 
“constitutional” in the sense that it rests upon premises related to the 
basic nature of our federal system which are presupposed to govern in 
the absence of clear congressional determination to change and 
reallocate power within that system.33 
By describing the Constitution and the constitution as functionally 
equivalent in this context, Mishkin implied that congressional politics 
would have to yield to the force of legal process principles just as 
obediently as would a judge’s idiosyncratic beliefs. Whatever balance the 
eighteenth-century Framers had imagined concerning state and federal 
power was supposed to travel fluidly through time, with nothing more 
than vague and general arguments about C/constitutional principles to 
sustain the trip. In turn, that eighteenth-century balance was supposed to 
integrate seamlessly with Mishkin’s opinions two centuries later about 
systemic traditions, necessities, and legal functionality. Citing Hart and 
Sacks’s The Legal Process itself, Mishkin expounded his C/constitutional 
argument without making any explicit reference to eighteenth-century text 
or practice. Nor did he analyze nineteenth-century traditions and history, 
which would have been dominated by the putative anti-precedent Swift v. 
Tyson in any event. Like other legal process functionalists, Mishkin 
instead voiced an ostensibly neutral and objective C/constitution that 
ultimately matched his own perceptions and ideas, which remained 
distinctively located within his own era.34 
31. Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie – The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682, 
1682 (1974). 
32. See infra notes 48–55 and accompanying text.
33. Id. at 1686 (alteration in original) (emphasis added). 
34. Id. at 1686 n.16 (citing HENRY HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1413 (tent. ed. 1958)); id. at 1686–87 (noting 
as a timeless principle “the constitutional perception that courts are inappropriate makers of laws 
intruding upon the states’ views of social policy in the areas of state competence” without explicitly 
distinguishing one hundred years of cases under Swift v. Tyson); id. at 1687 (“[I]t is the very essence 
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Step three examines Erie’s late-twentieth-century displacement from 
its central position in American legal culture. Relevant factors in that 
phenomenon included disputes over civil and political rights and a 
substantial growth of federal public law, including administrative law. 
The legal process school also confronted political challenges, insofar as 
its commitments to neutral principles, reasoned discourse, and systemic 
function were not always enough to satisfy public demands for racial 
justice, gender equality, and federal legal protection.35 
During the 1920s and 1930s, Swift’s federal general common law had 
shared legal headlines with the Court’s dramatic decisions to restrict the 
Commerce Clause cases and expand individual rights to contract.36 By the 
1960s and 1970s, however, issues surrounding Erie and diversity 
jurisdiction seemed much less important than questions about federal law 
and federal rights. Of course, Erie remained in the law school curriculum, 
but for most participants, studying such materials had become a necessary 
task more than a foundational struggle.37 
In 1969, the last year of Henry Hart’s life, the American Law 
Institute, led by Herbert Wechsler, approved a report to reflect these 
changing dynamics of jurisdictional emphasis.38 The committee proposed 
that federal courts should be “concentrated upon the adjudication of rights 
created by federal substantive law,” with one commentator suggesting—
despite some tension with state courts’ concurrent jurisdiction—that 
“questions of federal law are best left to the federal courts.”39 An earlier 
draft of the report claimed as a “basic proposition that federal courts 
should not be called upon for the administration of state law,” which, 
consistent with Erie, implied tighter statutory limits for diversity 
jurisdiction.40 Only in cases that involved federal law could members of 
the federal judiciary “exercise the creative function which is essential to 
of our system that once Congress has effectively enacted legislation, it need not begin again . . . to 
enforce any restrictions, but may instead rely wholly on the courts to provide such enforcement.”). 
35. See Hill, supra text accompanying note 25; PURCELL, supra note 3, at 272. 
36. Green, supra, note 2, at 419–26 (documenting the chronology and institutions that
produced and circulated critiques of Swift alongside other Lochner-era controversies). 
37. See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 
(12th ed. 2012) (discussing Erie without any discussion of constitutional issues); KATHLEEN M. 
SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (18th ed. 2013) (providing almost no 
discussion of Erie). 
38. PURCELL, supra note 3, 273–84. 
39. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE 
AND FEDERAL COURTS (1968). 
40. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE 
AND FEDERAL COURTS, OFFICIAL DRAFT, PART I (1965). 
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their dignity and prestige.”41 By contrast, “deciding [diversity] cases 
under state law imposes especially laborious burdens, often greater in fact 
that involved in resolving issues of federal law on which these courts may 
speak with their own authority.”42 
Some modern observers might accept as self-evident the ALI’s 
conclusion that “[u]niformity in application of federal law and the prompt 
vindication of national rights require that the federal district courts have 
original jurisdiction” for a broad range of cases about federal law, in order 
to guard against “the danger that state courts will not properly apply 
[federal] law, either through misunderstanding or lack of sympathy.”43 In 
1969, however, such statements were still components of a debatable 
vision involving (to borrow Hart and Wechsler’s phrase) “The Federal 
Courts and the Federal System.”44 Among other things, regional 
differences could often affect the public’s willingness to view federal 
courts’ enforcement of federal law as “vindication” as opposed to 
oppression by outsiders. As more time passed, however, the ever-
increasing priority afforded to federal-law cases continued to shift 
attention away from Erie and the application of state law in federal 
courts.45 
Alongside changes regarding the salience of state-law cases in 
federal court, institutional ideas about enforcing constitutional structure 
were also in flux during this period. Before 1938, federalism and 
separation of powers were typically expressed as judicial mandates that 
threatened to strike down, among other things, a New Deal that 
conservatives saw as unacceptably new and not enough of a deal.46 Legal 
process scholars like Mishkin, however, viewed constitutional structure 
as something that could be more broad and vague, emerging in contexts 
where—like Erie—there was not much need to search for detailed anchors 
in original text or history, and also where there was no immediate bite of 
counter-majoritarian judicial review.47 
41. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 39, at 99. 
42. Id. at 100. 
43. Id. at 168. 
44. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM (2015). 
45. Twenty-first-century statutory provisions concerning mass torts and class actions are recent 
exceptions to that principle. 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (2019) (providing federal jurisdiction for certain 
multiparty, multiforum tort litigation); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012) (codifying the “Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005”). 
46. Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131
HARV. L. REV. 1, 51–77 (2017).  
47. See supra text and accompanying notes 31–33. 
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Legal process thinkers were famously dissatisfied with positivism as 
a requirement for legal sources, and they often expressed constitutional 
analysis as values and dialogues instead of judicial edicts and 
enforcement. One reason that legal process scholars tended to view 
federal law as interstitial derived from the contexts that they choose to 
study, which characteristically included areas where Congress had not 
spoken or had done so with notable vagueness. 
By contrast, civil rights jurists did seek direct judicial enforcement 
of constitutional law through prescriptive mandates against political 
branches. They were not seeking to uncover a soft-spoken network of 
doctrine that somehow rendered the status-quo legal system both 
operational and functional. Instead, civil rights lawyers self-consciously 
mobilized institutional force in order to challenge hierarchies and 
folkways, supporting ideals of equality and liberty that were often linked 
more closely to a results-oriented future than a big-talking past.48 
To use Mishkin’s capitalization (one last time), late-twentieth-
century legal struggles often involved efforts to use Constitutional law in 
order to revise or replace some established forms of constitutional law. 
Alongside the civil rights era’s distinctive institutional focus on judicial 
enforcement, jurists during this period were substantively different from 
pre-New Deal constitutionalists because they focused on achieving new 
applications of constitutional liberty and equality instead of older visions 
of states’ rights and restricted federal power. All of these factors tended 
to shift Erie’s disputes over state law and federal courts even farther 
toward the sidelines. 
Step four considers Erie’s twenty-first-century development as a 
citable authority to support vigorous ideas from legal conservatives about 
judicially imposed federalism and separation of powers. Federalism came 
slightly earlier, which makes sense given its long history in twentieth-
century politics, its explicit reference in Erie’s text, and its featured 
presence in Judge Harlan’s legal process concurring opinion in Hanna v. 
48. Of course, the term “folkways” derives from much older scholarship concerning social
hierarchy and the contested potential for legal change. WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS: A 
STUDY OF MORES, MANNERS, CUSTOMS AND MORALS (1907). Distant and narrower echoes of such 
ideas can sometimes be found in modern constitutional scholarship. Cf., e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, 
FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL 
EQUALITY (2006); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1993). 
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Plumer.49 Over time, however, Erie’s separation-of-powers new myth has 
taken center stage.50 
Erie is not the only historical context from which modern 
conservatives have drawn newly urgent ideas about constitutional 
federalism and separation of power, combining legal process ideas about 
constitutional structure with civil rights ideas about judicial 
enforceability.51 Some advocates explicitly muster separation-of-powers 
arguments under the nondelegation doctrine’s timeworn battle flag, thus 
earning criticism for promoting an outdated 1930s redux.52 On other 
occasions, similar constitutional results are proposed as creative 
expressions of Supremacy Clause fundamentalism.53 And of course, 
sometimes the legal sources of such arguments remain vague and 
incompletely theorized, much as legal process scholars from past 
generations used terms like “Our Federalism” and “The Constitutional 
Structure” without fully justifying their use of possessive pronouns and 
definite articles. Erie represents only one strand of a renewed emphasis 
on constitutional structure that is expanding rapidly throughout a new 
generation of legal conservatives, and such developments in constitutional 
law and politics have already produced an extraordinary mixture of legal 
process rhetoric and pre-1937 outcomes.54 
It is difficult to forecast how the full potential of Erie’s new myth 
will develop in the near future. Brett Kavanaugh’s confirmation will 
provide America with the most politically conservative Supreme Court 
since 1937. Other federal courts include increasing numbers of 
conservative judges. And longstanding conservative calls for judicial 
restraint are now more than ever carefully targeted in order to restrict very 
specific kinds of legal rights. Elections have consequences, we are told, 
49. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938) (“We merely declare that in applying
[Swift v. Tyson] that this Court and lower courts have invaded rights which . . . are reserved by the 
Constitution to the several states.”); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (“I have always regarded that decision as one of the modern cornerstones of our 
federalism, expressing policies that profoundly touch the allocation of judicial power between the 
state and federal systems.”) 
50. Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, supra note 23, at 599–644; see also PURCELL, supra note 
3, at 290–92 (tracing a somewhat longer history for “new-myth” efforts to connect Erie with 
separation of powers). 
51. See, e.g., Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013); Craig Green,
Constitutional Chevron Debates and the Transformation of American Law, __ GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
__ (forthcoming 2019). 
52. Metzger, supra note 44 (criticizing such efforts).
53. Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731 (2010) 
(criticizing such efforts). 
54. See Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, supra note 23, at 599–644; Metzger, supra note 44. 
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and new arguments about constitutional structure might be midway 
toward becoming—in Jack Balkin’s evocative phrase—more on the wall 
than off the wall.55 Despite requests from some authors that the legal 
community should “normalize Erie,” or at least should repress the 
decision’s sprawling mythology, constitutional defenders of Erie show no 
signs of changing course or losing steam.56 If anything, the popularity and 
enthusiasm of new Erie arguments concerning separation of powers might 
grow stronger over time as American legal institutions shift even farther 
to the right. 
Step five concludes by analyzing the implications of interpreting 
iconic judicial precedents for a legal system’s stability. One dramatic 
development in recent decades has been the rise of formal systems for 
interpreting legal authorities other than judicial precedents, most notably 
including statutory textualism and constitutional originalism. In 
opposition to legal process scholars, and with ardent support from 
Reaganite conservatives like Justice Scalia, various kinds of interpretive 
formalism have promised to increase law’s stability and legitimacy by 
applying inflexible fidelity to foundational moments of lawmaking that 
are thereafter deemed authoritative. 
With Erie as a prime example, however, it should be clear that 
precedential interpretation has not undergone any comparably formalist 
shift in methodology. On the contrary, terms like precedential textualism, 
precedential originalism, dynamic precedentialism, or living 
55. Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J.
1407, 1446–47 (2001) 
During the last five years or so, I have been consistently wrong about what the Court was 
willing to do to promote its conservative agenda. Repeatedly—in cases [about judicially 
enforced federalism] like City of Boerne v. Flores, which struck down the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, and United States v. Morrison, which struck down the Violence 
Against Women Act—I have thought to myself: ‘They can’t possibly do that. That would 
be crazy.’ And each time I have been proven wrong. These recalcitrant experiences 
suggest to me that my own judgment about what is ‘on the wall’ and what is ‘off the wall,’ 
what is a good legal argument and what is wholly implausible is slowly but surely moving 
out of the mainstream, if that mainstream is defined by the actual holdings of the United 
States Supreme Court. My sense of what is possible and plausible, what is competent legal 
reasoning and what is simply made up out of whole cloth is probably mired in an older 
vision of the Constitution that owes much to the Warren and Burger Courts as well as to 
the predominantly liberal legal academy in which I was educated, trained, and now teach. 
Finally, I should note that as soon as each of these new Supreme Court decisions is handed 
down, dozens of bright young constitutional lawyers busily begin to rationalize it, showing 
how it is, after all, completely consistent with the text, structure, original intentions, values 
and traditions of the American Constitution. For these legal scholars, opinions like Boerne 
and Morrison are not off the wall. They are the wall. (footnotes omitted)). 
56. Compare, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Normalizing Erie, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1161 (2016), with, 
e.g., Young, supra note 23. 
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precedentialism are just as unrecognized in practice as they are unnamed 
in theory.57 The absence of such vocabulary might cause some readers to 
find the whole project of discussing interpretative methodologies for 
iconic precedents somehow alienating or misplaced. However, especially 
given the immense power of judicial decisions to influence the content 
and character of American law, it might be useful to consider interpretive 
stability and legitimacy in this context as well. Accordingly, even as 
Erie’s eightieth birthday offers a useful occasion to further explore the 
iconic decision itself, it also provides a useful opportunity to think more 
deeply about the way that the American legal system interprets iconic 
precedents as a category.58 
57. But cf. Green, supra note 3, 385–91 (introducing such methods of interpreting precedents). 
58. Id. at 484
At the very heart of our legal order, the most urgent and vital question is how judges and 
lawyers in ‘an indeterminate world’ can maintain what [Justice] Souter calls ‘a state of 
trust,’ believing that some ‘way will be found leading through an uncertain future’ even 
as the law’s future-oriented trajectory is anchored by precedents from the near and distant 
past. This Article’s interpretive methodology hopes to indirectly influence how lawyers 
and judges chart such paths forward. At the very least, a better understanding of 
precedential interpretation should help legal agents to recognize the dilemmas they face 
and techniques that are available along the way.  
(quoting Justice David H. Souter, Harvard University’s 359th Commencement Address, 124 HARV. 
L. REV. 429, 430 (2010)).  
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